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ARTISTS, GRANTS AND RIGHTS:
THE NEA CONTROVERSY REVISITED
by Robert M. O'Neil
During the relatively brief life of the restrictions which the
Helms Amendment1 imposed on grants from the National
Endowment for the Arts ("NEA"), several potential grantees sought
relief from the courts. Organizations as varied as Joseph Papp's New
York Shakespeare Festival,2 the Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation,3
*Funding Director, Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free

Expression; Professor of Law, University of Virgina; Former Law Clerk to Supreme
Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
1 Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 741, (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 954 (1990)). The statute states, in pertinent part:
No part of any appropriation contained in this act shall be

available for any activity of the publication or distribution of
literature that in any way tends to promote public support or
opposition to any legislative proposal on which congressional
action is not complete: Provided, That-(a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for
the National Endowment for the Arts or the National
Endowment for the Humanities may be used to
promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in
the judgment of the National Endowment for the Arts
or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be
considered obscene, including but not limited to,
depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the
sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged
in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
2 The New York Shakespeare Festival never sued, but the late Joseph Papp, a
prominent theatre producer, was disturbed by the possible effect of the Helms
Amendment. His dissatisfaction is evidenced by his well-publicized decision to
reject NEA funding last year to protest the organization's handling of a political
controversy which stemmed from disputes with conservative politicians led by
Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C. and sponsor of the Helms Amendment). Allan
Parachini, Joseph Papp Steps Down at N.Y. Shakespeare Festival, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 22,
1991, at F5.
3 Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Fronhmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Plaintiffs argued that the NEA requirements on grant certification that relate
specifically to obscenity were unconstitutionally vague thus violating the Fifth
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and the New School for Social Research4 either sued the NEA or
refused grants based on the possibility of content-based restrictions.
The grantees argued that the conditions Congress had imposed in
1989 abridged their constitutional rights.' During this period other
grantees refused federal arts funding because they would not, or in
good conscience could not, sign the pledge required of all
recipients.6
Though the compromise amendment ("Compromise"), which
was passed in the fall of 1990,' supplanted the Helms Amendment
Amendment Due Process Clause. Additionally, they argued that because the terms
regarding obscenity were unconstitutionally vague they also violated the First
Amendment by causing a "chilling effect" on artistic freedom. The Court held in
favor of both plaintiffs on both issues. Id. at 785.
' The New School for Social Research filed suit against the NEA in federal
district court, contending that the anti-obscenity requirement of the acceptance
statement, which grantees are required to sign under the 1990 amendment, is
unconstitutional. New School for Social Research v. Frohnmayer, No. 90 Civ 3510
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 23, 1990). The New School case has since been settled out of
court. Telephone interview with the Clerk of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York (October 24, 1991). See William H. Honan, Arts
Agency Voids Pledge On Obscenity, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1991, at C14.
' The plaintiffs in Bella Lewitzky "contend that the certification they are required
to make contains provisions of obscenity that are unconstitutionally vague, and
thus violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause." Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp.
at 781. In addition, plaintiffs assert "that the vagueness of the certification
requirement... violates the First Amendment as well... because it creates a
chilling effect on speech." Id. at 782.
6 Karin Lipson, Papp Spurns Grant Tied to Anti-Obscenity Vow, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
(City ed.), April 27, 1990, at 2. See, e.g., supra note 2, and accompanying text.
7 Pub. L. No. 101-512, §103(b) 104 Stat. 1915, 1963-66 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1990)). The Compromise reads as follows:
(d) No payment shall be made under this section except upon
application therefor which is submitted to the National
Endowment for the Arts in accordance with regulations issued
and procedures established by the Chairperson. In establishing
such regulations and procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure
that(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the
criteria by which applications are judged,
taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs
and values of the American public; and
(2) applications are consistent with the
purposes of the section. Such regulations and
procedures shall clearly indicate that
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and muted much of the controversy within the arts community, the
underlying issues are still very much alive because some grantees
remain subject to the earlier restrictions!
The first judicial opinion regarding these issues came from a
federal district court in Los Angeles early in January, 1991. 9 The
ground-breaking case was brought by the Bella Lewitzky Dance
Company, joined by the Newport Harbor Art Museum and several
major foundations, including the Rockefeller Foundation." The
district court held the restrictions to be unconstitutional, finding that
"[t]he certification requirement does, contrary to the NEA's
statements, place an obstacle in the grant of the recipient's path to
the exercise of his [or her] constitutional rights."" Other decisions
will presumably follow during the ensuing months.
Moreover, the change in the funding law late in 1990 by no
means moots the issues or limits constitutional challenges to grants
under the prior law.12 While the new post-Helms restrictions may
be substantially less onerous than those they replaced, they certainly
are not free of problems or concerns. The constitutional issue is
surely one of profound importance to creative
persons, whether or
13
not they seek or receive direct NEA funding.
A challenge to the constitutionality of the NEA's federal
funding restrictions involves at least three key arguments: (1) that art
is "speech" protected by the First Amendment, (2) that denial of a
obscenity is without artistic merit, is not
protected speech, and shall not be funded.
Projects, productions, workshops, and
programs that are determined to be obscene
are prohibited from receiving financial
assistance under this Act from the National
Endowment for the Arts.
'The Compromise was enacted November 5, 1990, and does not apply
retroactively. Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 103(h), 104 Stat. 1965, (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. § 9540)(3)(A) (1990)) ("This subsection shall not apply with respect to
financial assistance provided before the effective date of this subsection.").
Therefore, any grantee who applied for funds while the Helms Amendment was
in effect remains subject to its provisions.
' Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.

1991).
Id. at 776.
1 Id.at 785.
12 Id. at 777.
13 Id. at 783.
10
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grant due to the content of the art constitutes abridgement of that
speech, and (3) that the restrictions imposed by Congress on the
National Endowment are constitutionally suspect. This Article will
explore the validity of these arguments and analyze the likelihood of
success that litigants face in opposing the NEA's content based
restrictions.
I. ARTISTIC EXPRESSION Is PROTECTED
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The first important question in this context is whether and to
what extent the First Amendment protects the arts and artistic
expression. It should be easy to read the First Amendment and
reach the conclusion that all art is protected, and indeed some courts
and commentators have treated the matter as obvious. More than a
half century ago, Zechariah Chafee wrote confidently in the first of
the major treatises on free speech: "Freedom of speech covers much
more than political ideas. It embraces all discussion which enriches
human life and helps it to be more wisely led."' 4 Following
Chafee's lead, the Supreme Court held as early as 1952 that motion
pictures represent a protected form of speech.'" Later the Court
extended that protection to entertainment in different forms, as
varied as rock musicals"' and nude dancing.1 7 The Court has stated
that First Amendment rights are protected as a rule,18 with
categories of unprotected speech delineated as exceptions. 9
There is relatively recent case law which offers support for
the proposition that various forms of artistic expression are indeed
14 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

545-46 (1941).
' 5 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
16Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). "By its nature,
theater usually is the acting out - or singing out - of the written word, and
frequently mixes speech with live action or conduct. But that is no reason to hold
theater subject to a drastically different standard." Id. at 557-58.
" Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (adult films may not be
prohibited solely because they display nudity). But cf. Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc.,
59 U.S.L.W. 4745 (1991) (state statute criminalizing public nudity constitutionally
applies to nude dancing, in public places, before consenting adults).
1" Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503 ("IT]he basic principles of freedom of speech and the
press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as they
have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the

rule.").
19Id.
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protected by the First Amendment. For example, in 1975 the
Supreme Court held that a city could not exclude performances of
the rock musical Hairfrom a public auditorium, at least not without
While the majority focused
elaborate procedural safeguards.
more on the absence of procedural safeguards than the substantive
issue concerning content screening,' the Court did feel it necessary
to discuss briefly the nature of the activity that the city authorities
had summarily barred.'
The Court's assertions about the medium of expression were,
however, clearly dictum. To rule in favor of the show's promoters
required the Court to do no more than fault the city's shoddy way
of handling permit requests. Serious gaps and errors in procedure
made it unnecessary to decide whether or not the proposed use of
the facility was clearly entitled to First Amendment protection. 2
The arbitrary and subjective reasons the city gave for barring the
musical would have sufficed, according to the majority, "only if we
were to conclude that live drama is unprotected by the First
Amendment - or subject to a different standard from that applied to
other forms of expression."'2 Despite the City's urging, no member
of the Court argued that rock musicals should be so viewed.
Less frequently recalled from the Southeastern Promotions
opinion is an important caveat: "Each medium of expression, of
course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems."'
Earlier, the Burstyn 6 Court used similar reasoning when it held that
motion pictures are not "necessarily subject to the precise rules
governing any other particular method of expression. Each method
The fact-sensitive
tends to present its own peculiar problems."'
nature of the inquiry offers at least some basis for the claim (or the
fear) that creative and performing arts enjoy less than the full
measure of protection to which the spoken and printed word are
2o Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
21 Id. at 561-62.
' Id. Petitioner applied for a lease to use a theatre to present the play Hair, a
musical involving group nudity, obscenity and simulated sex on stage. Id.
2 Id. at 558-62.
24 Id.

at 557.

2 Southeastern, 420 U.S. at 557.
" Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
' Id. at 503.
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clearly entitled.2
Even in the lower courts, the case law is
surprisingly meager and the judicial views are in less than perfect
accord.
One example will illustrate the problem. A federal district
court in the early 1970s upheld removal of several controversial
paintings from gallery space in a state university student center.29
The judgment reflected in major part the court's grudging view of
the works that provoked the dispute.' ° Without deciding what
degree of deference judges ought in principle to extend to works of
art, the court in Close found the claim for protection a weak one,
stating that "there is no suggestion that, unless in its cheap titles,
plaintiff's art was seeking to express political or social thought."'"
The court compared the paintings before it to campus speaker bans,
which in its view, "involve a medium and subject matter entitled to
greater protection than plaintiff's art."32
Such comments may seem as quaint as they are benighted.
Yet as recently as 1988, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which
was about to sustain an order requiring the removal of Richard
Serra's Tilted Arc from Manhattan's Federal Plaza, would do no more
than concede that "artwork, like other non-verbal forms of
expression, may under some circumstances constitute speech for First
Amendment purposes."' Such a sparing view of protection for art
is by no means confined to unsympathetic judges.' Scholars, even
some with firm devotion to freedom of expression, have been
troubled about embracing the arts, while others with impeccable civil
libertarian credentials have simply neglected the issue as though it
2 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ...abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... ").
' Close v. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969), rev'd, 424 F.2d 988 (1st
Cir. 1970).
30 Close, 424 F.2d at 991. "In hyperconcern with his [or her] personal rights
plaintiff would... regard his [or her] interests in self-expression as more important
than the interests of his [or her] unwilling audience ...
31 Id.
32 Id.

' Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045,1048 (2d Cir. 1988),
affg Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 667 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
See, e.g., Jesse Helms, Art, The First Amendment and the NEA Controversy, 14

NOVA L. REV. 317, 318 (1990) ("'[Wlorks of art' [that] were offensive to the majority
of Americans... was [sic] the basis of my offering an amendment to the Interior
Appropriations bill to prohibit the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) from
using tax dollars to subsidize or reward 'art' which is blasphemous or obscene.").
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did not exist or were unworthy of time and attention. The late
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., for example, wrote some years ago:
The classic defense of John Stuart Mill and the
modem defense of Alexander Meiklejohn do not help
much when the question is why the novel, the poem,
the painting, the drama, or the piece of sculpture falls
within the protection of the First Amendment. Nor
do the opinions of Hand, Holmes and Brandeis. The
emphasis is all on truth winning out in a fair fight
between competing ideas [and on the] argument that
free speech is indispensable to the informed citizenry
required to make self-government work. The people
need free speech because they vote. [But] not all
communications are relevant to the political process.
The people do not need novels or dramas or
paintings or poems because they will be called upon
to vote. Art and belles-lettres do not deal in such
ideas -- at least not good art or belles-lettres....

[Thus] there seems to be a hiatus in our basic free
speech theory. 3'
Professor Meiklejohn promptly replied to Kalven's challenge
by explaining that "[there] are many forms of thought and expression
within the range of human communication from which the voter
derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the
capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a
People need novels and dramas and37
ballot should express."'
they will be called upon to vote.
"because
poems,
and
paintings
The primary social fact which blocks and hinders the success of our
experiment in self-government is that our citizens are not educated
for self-government.'
Yet the consensus remains curiously muddled, as Professor
Sheldon Nahmod noted several years ago in one of the few articles
devoted to this question:
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1%0 SUP. Cr. REV.
1, 15-16 (1960).
' Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REV.

245, 256 (1961).
37 Id. at 263.
38
Id.
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Artistic expression has been assigned a derivative and
second class status in the views of many first
amendment thinkers, the Supreme Court and other
courts.... [F]rom a first amendment perspective the
ideal kind of expression is political discourse, and all
other kinds of expression, including artistic
expression, are accorded lower degrees of first
amendment protection depending on their similarity
to political expression.'
While conceding the primacy which discussion of politics and
government has as the basis of the First Amendment guarantee of
free expression in our system, one can hardly neglect the arts.
Attention to the importance of the arts may be linked to selfgovernment as Chafee and Meiklejohn argue, or one may offer a
bolder and more sweeping rationale for their inclusion.
Surely the creative process and those who practice it ought
to be as fully protected under the First Amendment as are users of
the spoken and printed word. Whatever may have been the intent
of the Framers, who were likely aware and appreciative of the values
of the fine and performing arts, there is no clear constitutional basis
on which to exclude artistic expression from the realm of protected
expression or even to assign it a lower level of protection.'
Therefore, the burden of persuasion ought to rest upon the party
who argues that art, music, drama or sculpture is not protected,
rather than upon one who claims the arts' inclusion among protected
forms of expression.
II. DENIAL OF AN NEA GRANT
BASED ON CONTENT IS UNCONSTIUTIONAL
If we can, for the moment, assume that art is safely within
the realm of protected speech, we may then turn to the second
argument, that basing a denial of a grant on a content based
restriction abridges the grantee's First Amendment rights. This issue
" Sheldon Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the
Sublime, and the First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 221, 222 (1987).

0 For example, commercial speech and defamatory speech are granted a lower
level of protection than expressive speech. See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of

Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITt. L. REv. 519 (1979); Cass R.
Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 891 (1984).
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poses in novel form an increasingly familiar constitutional question.
Claims by government beneficiaries such as grantees and applicants
for grants could, not so long ago, be dismissed as merely seeking
privileges rather than claiming rights. ' Well into the 1950s, even
persons seeking or wishing to retain government jobs could be
turned aside on this basis, since no one has a right to public
employment.' Claims to less substantial government benefits such
as a physician's license, public housing tenancy, public welfare, and
a public college education, received even less deference.' Thus
applicants for these government benefits were told that the
government could impose as. a "lesser" indignity virtually any
condition it wished since it held the "greater" option of denying the
- .
,
largesse entirely."
The Warren Court, in the late 1950s, began to change the way
the Supreme Court viewed government largesse.- In what would
become one of Justice Brennan's most important and durable
contributions to constitutional law, the Court announced the doctrine
of unconstitutional

conditions ,in, Sherbert v.

Verner,

and

reemphasized Sherbert in subsequent decisions.' That doctrine put
to rest the increasingly tenuous distinction between "right" and
"William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise,of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1440 n.4 and accompanying text, 1442
(1968). "[Tlhe distinction between constitutionally protected rights of private
citizens and unprotected governmental privileges has been applied to defend a
great variety of claims associated with-government employment or other forms of
largess." Id. at 1440. Compare Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)
(upholding the military's exclusion of a civilian employee due to a failure to meet
security requirements without a hearing and without advice as to their specific
grounds for exclusion) with Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (holding that the
military's exclusion of a civilian employee due to a failure to meet security
requirements without a full hearing where the employee's accusers could be
confronted violates the Due Process Clause"of the Fifth Amendment).
"Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 365 (Ten. 1927) ("[Iln dealing with its own
employees engaged upon its own work, the State is not hampered by the
limitations of... the Constitution ofthe United.States.").
"Van Alstyne, supra note 41, at 1441.
"Id. at 1441-42.
45374 U.S. 398 (1963).
"See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (applying mere rational basis
standard in upholding state welfare statute setting $250 maximum monthly
payment); Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618 (1%9) (strict scrutiny applies to
waiting period requirement in state welfare statute finding it to be unconstitutional
discrimination against newly arrived residents).,
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"privilege" and recognized that freedoms of speech and religion
could be as effectively stifled by denying governmental benefits, or
by attaching conditions to the offer of such benefits, as by directly
sanctioning the protected activity.47 Within a decade, courts ceased
discussing benefits as dispensable or pliable, and spoke instead of
constitutional interests that transcended the source of the underlying
claim for benefits.'
Despite the number of cases dealing with a wide range of
government benefits and beneficiaries, the precise issue before us,
restrictions on NEA grants, seems to have been litigated but once.
In the early 1970s the literary magazine Granite sought a grant from
the New Hampshire Commission on the Arts.49 The Commission
initially recommended modest support for the journal, but the
Governor and the Council reversed that award upon discovering a
rather bold poem, "Castrating the Cat," in an early issue.' The
verse, which the Governor termed "an item of filth," contained
several profane words and mildly suggestive language."' On that
basis the grant was denied, and the Commission was so informed.52
Granite's publisher (a nonprofit corporation) brought suit in
federal court, claiming the grant denial was an abridgment of its First
Amendment freedoms.' The publisher was joined by a national
organization, Advocates for the Arts, and by a writer whose work
had appeared in the magazine.' The district court dismissed the
The Court of
suit, finding no basis for federal intervention.'
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, although it found that a grant
'7

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. Due to a governmental condition, the plaintiff is

forced "to choose between following... her religion and... abandoning... her
religion in order to accept work.... Governmental imposition of such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine
imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Id. at 404.
See generally Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of
UnconstitutionalConditions, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185 (1990).
'4 Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1976)
8

[hereinafter Thomson In].
o Id. at 793.
Id. at 798 (the poem's questionable terms include "balls," "cunt," "urine," and
"sac.").
'2

Id. at 793.

s' Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 397 F. Supp. 1048, 1049 (D.N.H. 1975)

[hereinafter Thomson 1].
S4Id.

's Id. at 1053.
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applicant had standing and had presented a justiciable
controversy.' Although there was no jurisdictional defect, the First
Circuit held that there simply had not been a sufficient showing that
the plaintiff's First Amendment rights were abridged to warrant
Even where content restrictions are imposed, "a
relief.5 7
disappointed grant applicant cannot complain that his [or her] work
has been suppressed, but only that another's has been promoted in
its stead."'
Although the Supreme Court in Southeastern Promotions9
may appear to conflict with Thomson, the Thomson decision
distinguishes the cases on two grounds. First, the Thomson court
characterized the grant at issue as "a program directly subsidizing
artistic projects"' and characterized the grant in Southeastern6' as
a "plan to construct ...an auditorium... and to schedule artistic
performances therein."'62 The Southeastern Court's finding that a
municipality's refusal to schedule a production on obscenity grounds
was a prior restraint was dependent upon the Court characterizing
the auditorium as a public forum.' Traditionally, our legal system
requires that expression in public forums be absolutely free from
governmental interference." Accordingly, the municipality's refusal
to schedule a particular production in an auditorium constituted
unlawful governmental interference with artistic expression in a
public forum.' The Thomson court further distinguished the two
cases and stated that "while it may be feasible to allocate space in an
auditorium without consideration of the expressive content of
competing applicant's productions, such neutrality in a program for
5 Thomson II,532 F.2d at 794.
57 Id. at 798.
Ild. at 795.
5 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
o Thomson II, 532 F.2d at 796.
61 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
62 Thomson II, 532 F.2d at 796.
6 Southeastern, 420 U.S. at 570 (treating the auditorium as it would a city street
or park).
" Thomson II, 532 F.2d at 796. "[T]here is no similar tradition of absolute
neutrality for activities involving speech. ... Our books are replete with laws
providing financial assistance to the exercise of free speech." Id. (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
65

Id.
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public funding of the arts is inconceivable."
Almost as an afterthought, the appellate judges in Thomson II
faulted the process they had just upheld, stating,
[w]hat is perhaps most troubling about this case is
not that Granite should be denied public support, but
that the denial should be based on a reading of just
one poem in a back issue, without consideration of
the overall quality of the publication either alone or
as compared to competing grant applicants.67
This concern, however, still does not reach the constitutional level;
without a right to public support of private expression there can be
no constitutional argument.' And even if a constitutional argument
could be made, it is not clear what different process to select grantees
should be advocated. A hearing would not likely suffice and it is
doubtful whether an "explicit finding of artistic merit would have
'
any more than cosmetic significance."69
The last phrase seems
especially revealing; in a world where subjectivity is essential to
make the NEA program serve its stated purpose, even the judgment
of an expert panel that a work has artistic merit is not enough to
gainsay the political and admittedly casual judgment of the Governor
and his or her Council.
The court did offer one tantalizingly hopeful dictum: "[a]
6Id.

The purpose of such a program is to promote 'art,' the very
definition of which requires an exercise of judgment from case
to case. Moreover, money is a more flexible instrument than a
public building: an applicant may receive varying amounts
depending upon his [or her] needs and the promise of his [or

her] work; similarly, the quantity of available funds may vary.
Solutions that work for an auditorium, such as scheduling on a
first-come-first-served basis or upon a prescribed showing of the
likely box-office success . . . are simply not available to a
program for funding the arts.
Id. (footnote omitted).

67 Id. at 797.
6Id.
61 Id. Such a finding lacks the necessary public scrutiny and discussion,
therefore increasing the likelihood of discrimination. Id. at 497-98 n.7.
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claim of discrimination would be another matter."' If plaintiffs
show a "pattern of discrimination impinging upon the basic first
amendment right to full and free debate on matters of public interest
...a

constitutional remedy would surely be appropriate."'

But the

facts here stop well short of documenting any such pattern; all that
was before the court was a single rejection based on a single poem
in a single magazine? 2
It seems remarkable that despite the public discussion and
congressional debate, Thomson is apparently the only reported case
on point prior to the January, 1991, Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation
decision.'
Although the First Circuit left room for further
interpretation in the form of proof of discrimination on the basis of
the content of the artwork, or the particular medium of expression,
few, if any, cases have ever been able to show such a pattern.74 If
a granting officer or agency official flatly announces a policy of
categorically rejecting art per se, or art in a particular medium, such
a case could be viable.'m This standard is analogous to requiring
persons who challenge loyalty oaths and disclaimers to prove either
that the oath is directed only against adherents of a particular
philosophy, or that its application had adversely affected only
members of a given organization.76 If the courts had not been
willing to identify the chilling effect of negative oaths for
conscientious but loyal non-signers, 7' virtually everyone in public
employment would still be required to forswear a wide range of
" Thomson II, 532 F.2d at 798. Governmental distribution of art grants on the
basis of an applicant's political views and associations would violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Id.
71Id.

2 Id. at 797. ("[Dlistribution of art grants on the basis of... the applicant's
political views, associations, or activities would violate the Equal Protection
Clause."). Id. at 798 n.8 (citing Thomson I, 397 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (1975)).
" Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.

1991).
7'See Thomson II, 532 F.2d at 798.
Id. at 797-98 nn.7-8.
7 Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592 (1%7) (holding
unconstitutional a requirement that public school teachers, upon being hired,
answer under oath whether they had ever advised or taught or were ever a
member of any society or group of persons which taught or advocated the doctrine
that the government of the United States or any political subdivisions thereof

should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means).
"Id. at 604.
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political associations and activities.' Though the NEA grantees'
claims were largely unsuccessful, by.the time these recent cases were
heard the courts were at least receptive to the particular types of
challenges they posed."
III. THE NEA RESTRICTIONS ARE CONSTITUnONALLY SUSPECT
The third and remaining question concerns the substance of
the challenge, the precise ways in which these restrictions might be
said to abridge the freedom of expression.' The constitutional
issues posed by the Helms Amendment restrictions are far easier to
identify than those which arise under the 1990 revision.8 ' There are
three basic problems, one of substance and two of process. The
substantive issue arises from the ambiguity in the definition of
particular words which would cause a grant to be denied. 2 After
nearly a quarter century during which the NEA was free of
congressionally imposed content restrictions,' the language
proposed by Senator Helms took effect in the fall of 1989." Under
that scheme, clearly grants were to be denied to "obscene" works, but
it was equally clear that the ban was not confined to works that
could be deemed legally "obscene" under the Supreme Court's
I

Id. at 606 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of

Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ. of N.Y.C.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
" See, e.g., Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 78182 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
o Id. at 782-83 (vagueness of certification requirement creates chilling effect on
speech).
81Pub. L. No. 101-512, §§ 102(c), 103(a),(b), 104 Stat. 1915, 1963 (1990) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1965)). A recent attempt at changing tlhe
language of the Helms Amendment was defeated. In September, 1991, the Senate
approved added restrictions by a 68 to 28 vote. William H. Honan, In Brooklyn,
Congress Hears From Artists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,1991, at C18. However, on October
24, 1991, the House voted to drop the language by a narrow 214 to 205 margin.
House Drops Obscenity, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1991, at 16.
2 Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§954 (1990)). See Helms, supra note 34, at 320.
8 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1965). The Helms Amendment marks the first time a
member of Congress has tried to impose content based restrictions on NEA
grantees.
"See supra note 1.
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carefully refined definition.' The problem stems from the language
added by the Amendment following the reference to obscenity:
"including, but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged
in sex acts and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."'
Had the ban proscribed "obscene" material only, a
constitutionally valid boundary would have been delineated.87 The
ban as enacted, however, goes much further. It invokes terms
lacking the precision of the legal definition that, for example,
"obscenity" has received over the years.'
There simply is no
contextual or legally accepted definition for a term such as "homoeroticism."" Even more invasive of the right of free speech is that
the ban would reach material which by definition is not legally
obscene, and therefore is constitutionally protected. A notable
example is the reference to "depictions of individuals engaged in sex
acts."'90 Any claim that this language is not intended to reach
beyond what the First Amendment protects simply does not reflect
the accompanying committee report of the Helms Amendment which
notes, inter alia, that "recently works have been funded which are
without artistic value but which are criticized as pornographic and
shocking by any standards."' Thus, there seems little doubt that
the language in the Helms Amendment gives not only an option, but
indeed a mandate to deny funding to artists' works which are well
' See Helms, supranote 34, at 340 (the Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973), defines as obscene material which, "1)when taken as a whole, the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find appeals
to the prurient interest; 2) depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way; and 3) taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.").
• Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1990)).
' See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
88
Id.

" See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-72 nn.3-5 (1977) (holding that it is not

necessary for a statute to state specifically a description of the type of sexual
conduct which it intends to proscribe).
9 Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-21, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 741.
"H.R. 264, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 6407 (1989) (remarks of Rep. Yates, D.-IU.).
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within the bounds of protected free expression.'
Two procedural elements compound the difficulty with the
Helms Amendment. It is not the courts but the agency that is to
make the critical judgment regarding the relative obscenity of the
work.' Funding must be withheld from works "[w]hich in the
judgment of the National Endowment for the Arts . . . may be

considered"" to be obscene. This is the preface to the substantive
standards noted above. Thus, not only is the substantive standard
deficient, but that inadequacy is compounded by the informality and
lack of procedural safeguards to make the proper judgment by
removing it from the absolute control of the governing agency.9"
Finally, the language and its impact are aggravated by the
provision which requires of all grantees a veritable oath or signed
disclaimer that they will not violate the substantive provisions of the
law.' The standards themselves are intrusive enough; to require
' See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.
1991). See generally Note, Standardsfor Federal Funding of the Arts: Free Expression
and Political Control, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1969 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Standards].
See Note, Standards, supra note 92, at 1978.
Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, Tit. III, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741
(emphasis added).
Note, Standards, supra note 92, at 1978-80.
Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 741, § 304(a) states that:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the
National Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment
for the Humanities may be used to promote, disseminate, or
produce materials which in the judgment of the National
Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment for the
Humanities may be considered obscene, including but not
limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the
sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex
acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The Statement of Policy and Guidance of the National Endowment for the Arts
states,
Accordingly, grant recipients, in order to receive funds, must
agree that they will not use those grant funds to promote,
disseminate or produce materials that are "obscene" under the
well-settled legal definition employed by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. California.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, STATEMENT OF POLICY AND GUIDANCE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 304 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1990 (JULY 5, 1990). See also Stephen

F. Rohde, Art of the State: CongressionalCensorship of the National Endowment for the
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grantees to swear acceptance to them is a clear transgression of the
grantees' constitutional rights.' The courts have long made clear
their abhorrence for mandates of this type, especially in dealing with
sensitive expression, belief and association."
Therefore, the
mechanism by which it is imposed is as much a matter of concern as
are the operative terms of the Helms Amendment. 9
Fortunately, the amendment has been superseded by a vastly
improved approach adopted by Congress in 1990.1' The new
formula contains two essential elements to supplant the Helms
Amendment. The first is a simple, if imprecise, declaration; in the
broad provisions that cover the making of grants, Congress has now
directed the NEA to consider "general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."''
This language seems to have no independent operative
force, but it might be used to guide panels and agency officers
among various desiderata to be applied in the review of
proposals. 10 2 However, the NEA chairman has given his assurance
that he does not plan to apply or enforce this language as a grant
criterion."°3
The change in the locus of decision contained in the
Arts, 12

HASTNGS COMM.

& ENT. L. J. 353, 365 (1990).

See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (imposition of
affirmative obligation for addressee to send card to Postmaster General to receive
foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda" unconstitutional limitation
of First Amendment rights).
9 Id.
" National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§

951-57, 135 Cong. Rec. § 8806.
Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101-512, §103(b), 104 Stat. 1915, 1963 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)
(1990)).
Id. §§ 103(b), 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 103(b), 104 Stat. 1915, 1964, (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(2) (1990)) (The chairperson's approval or disapproval of an
application is not evidence that a proposed project is or is not "obscene." This
makes the above-mentioned guidelines and procedures highly subjective).
113 See Kim Masters, N.E.A. Drops Obscenity Pledge, WASH. PosT, Oct. 30, 1990,
at C1 (agency spokesman confirmed that the agency would no longer require grant
recipients to sign a pledge that they will not violate congressionally imposed
""

obscenity restrictions).

102

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

Compromise °" , from the agency to the courts is as significant an
improvement as the language of the amendment. The Helms
Amendment view that the NEA is the proper body to determine
what is and is not "obscene" in determining grant awards has been
abolished." In a field where scrupulous adherence to procedure
has always been a quid pro quo for substantive restraint, the notion of
inviting a grant-making agency to form its own definition of
"obscenity" seems especially abhorrent. It is probable that the
informal process would have been enjoined by the courts had any of
the several constitutional challenges to the Helms Amendment come
to trial before the reauthorization." °
Under the congressional compromise, it is now clear that
judgments about obscenity in the arts must be made by the
courts."' The standards to be applied are those that judges have
fashioned over a period of more than three decades." s If, but only
if, a grant recipient is later convicted of an obscenity charge, is the
agency empowered to seek recovery of a related grant. °9 Grant
recipients are no longer required to certify under oath that they will
adhere to and enforce the statutory ban on any use of N.E.A. funds
for purposes which the agency "may... considerD ...obscene."'" 0
The new approach of the 1990 compromise is a major
improvement in both substance and procedure. It removes the most
10'
Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 102(c), 104 Stat. 1915, 1962 (codified as amended at 20

U.S.C. § 954(d) (1990)).
105Id.

"6Dial Info. Servs. Corp. of N.Y. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991);
Info. Provider's Coalition of the First Amendment v. F.C.C., 928 F.2d 866 (3d Cir.
1991) (The court implied the necessity of the agency's definition to comport with
the Supreme Court's definition by holding that "the Commission['s]... defin[ition]
of obscenity applied in numerous Supreme Court cases."). Id. at 874.
101
Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 102(c), 104 Stat. 1915,1965 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 954 (1989)).
"oSee, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985) (determining
that standard of prurient interests may not include lust that involves "only normal,
healthy, sexual desires"); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (requiring that
obscenity determination depict or describe sexual conduct in a "patently offensive
way" as defined by state law); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (defining
obscenity according to average person's application of contemporary community
standards in light of dominant theme's appeal to prurient interests).
10"
Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 103(h)(1)(i), 104 Stat. 1965 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 954 (5)(1989)).
110Id.

1991]

NEA CONTROVERSY

103

intrusive and demeaning provisions of the Helms Amendment, and
removes from the role of police officer a benign agency that must
have the confidence of the arts community if it is to carry out the
mission given it by Congress a quarter century ago."'
The substitute approach is not, however, without potential
problems. Funding with no content restrictions of any kind would
have been preferable not only to artists and some members of
Congress, but also to a most thoughtful bipartisan Presidential
commission which filed its report shortly before Congress acted on
the NEA's future." 2 In its key section, the Commission recommends
"against legislative changes to impose specific restrictions on the
content of works of art supported by the Endowment."'
The
report continues, "Content restrictions may raise serious
constitutional issues, would be inherently ambiguous and would
most certainly involve the Endowment and the Department of Justice
in costly and unproductive lawsuits."" 4
Some may argue that the new congressional approach does
not even involve "content restrictions," but simply entails the
addition of a sanction for violating existing and constitutionally valid
obscenity laws. Yet the effects of the new approach for the sensitive
and conscientious artist may also be quite different from the effect
which would have followed from reauthorization without content
restrictions or collateral sanctions.
In four specific ways the reauthorization may still deter or
make anxious the scrupulous creative person who seeks NEA
support."' The first and perhaps most obvious effect flows from
the prominent reference to "decency."'" 6 Despite the NEA's
assurance that such language is "non-binding,""7 and despite the
1 Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101-512, § 103, 104 Stat. 1915, 1963 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)

(1990)).
112INDEPENDENT

COMMISSION,

ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTs
113Id.

REPORT

TO

CONGRESS

ON

THE

NATIONAL

89 (Sept. 11, 1990).

Id.
Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101-512 § 103(b), 104 Stat. 1915,1963 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)
114
11

(1990)).
116
1

104 Stat. at 1965.
Christopher Meyers, Arts Backers Are Pleased by Congress's 3-Year

Reauthorization of NEA Without Restrictions, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUc., Nov. 7,

1990, at A19.
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absence of any enforcement provision or penalty, some members of
the arts community find it not only offensive but ominous as
well."' Marilyn Hacker, the editor of the Kenyon Review," 9 for
example, calls the "decency" phrase "dangerously vague" and
"incredibly ambiguous."'2 She adds: "Although you don't have to
sign anything, it once again leaves open a broad area that was never
in question in the past."''" Surely a conscientious artist might be
uneasy both about the contours of "decency" and about its possible
application to his or her creative works." m
A second risk is the potential chilling effect created by the
new approach to grant eligibility."
While the judgment about
what is 'obscene' now rests with the courts,2 the sensitive and
conscientious artist might well be fearful about the new collateral
sanction the reauthorization creates."
Such fears will be
heightened by the state of the law-we reviewed earlier, and the
uncertain basis of artists' expressive and creative freedoms. 26 Until
recently an established artist might reasonably have assumed his or
her works were immune from obscenity charges, and an NEA grant
quite secure, since no such charges had been brought in recent
times. 27
The prosecution of Cincinnati's Contemporary Art Center
over the late photographer Robert Mapplethorpe exhibit, despite the
outcome, squarely challenges that assumption." Notwithstanding
I's Id.
119 Id. at

A23.

Id.

12D
121

Id.

, See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 782 (C.D.

Cal. 1991).
123 Id. at 783.
124See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
12 Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101-512 § 103(b), 104 Stat. 1915, 1963 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954
(d) (1990)) (conviction of obscenity results in grant recission).
12 See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
If See Rohde, supra note 96, at 353-58.
128 Contemporary Arts Center v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (finding
the photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe not obscene despite their sexual and
homoerotic content).
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the unusual circumstances of that case,12 9 artists can no longer

dismiss the possibility of criminal liability. Artists are, therefore,
bound to think twice before testing the limits of taste and decorum.
The world of art is bound to suffer from any such lessening of
creative spirit.
A third danger is that museums and galleries may be less
venturesome in seeking or displaying bold and controversial works.
The events in Cincinnati again supply an illustration because this
Mapplethorpe exhibit, as well as the individual artist, had received
NEA support. While posthumous recovery of grant money from an
artist's estate is improbable, it is uncertain whether a gallery would
forfeit an NEA grant if its director were convicted on charges like
those filed in the Cincinnati case - especially if the death of the artist
left the gallery as the only possible avenue of recourse for the
agency. Under those conditions, greater caution might be predicted
on the part of those galleries that can least afford to forfeit
government grants precisely because they do test the limits of taste
by displaying the avant garde. Here, too, the world of creative art
may stand to lose in the chillier climate that follows compromise.
There is a fourth and final, somewhat subtler, kind of risk.
Those who pressed so hard to make the NEA an administrative
censor are not likely to retreat from the field because they lost this
battle. In fact, it is possible to imagine all NEA grantees now
becoming targets of self-appointed guardians of decency and
propriety in quest of evidence of obscenity in funded works. This is
a frightening prospect indeed. It recalls vigilante movements of
earlier and unhappier times in our national life, when the demon
was sought in politics rather than in art."3
The analogy is
uncomfortably accurate, and the potential chilling effect on
individuals censoring their own private activity is greater even than
that of government persecution.
Such risks and hazards do not, of course, necessarily make a
valid constitutional challenge. They do, however, set the stage for
possible challenges to the far less troubling language of the
"I Id. at 744 (After the Arts Center put the Mapplethorpe work on display,
police entered the museum pursuant to a search warrant and videotaped each of
the 175 photographs on display.).
130 See Note, Standards, supra note 92, at 1970 ("The anti-Communist frenzy that
led to the abolition of remaining WPA arts programs... signaled to artists that the
United States was a patron concerned more with the politics of artists and artistic
styles than with the inherent quality of artworks.") (citations omitted).
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compromise that replaced the Helms Amendment. Surely such a
challenge would not be averted by Senator Helms' own claim that
"refusing to subsidize something does not 'ban' it." 131 That body
of law dealing with unconstitutional conditions is far too advanced
to permit any branch of government to hide behind distinctions
between conditioned benefits and direct sanctions. 2 More
troublesome is the unavoidable truth that government cannot
possibly fund every applicant or subsidize every work of art, making
some sort of neutral selective criteria necessary. Dean Geoffrey
Stone"3 poses the dilemma in this way:
Although government may not ban offensive art, it
does not necessarily follow that it must therefore
subsidize such art. Surely, government is under no
constitutional obligation to establish the NEA in the
first place. Why, then, if it chooses to fund some art,
should it be precluded from exercising reasonable
judgment about the types of art it will support? For
example, although government cannot ban "bad" art,
it is surely under no constitutional obligation to fund
"bad" art, even if it supports "good" art. Why, then,
must government fund art that denigrates religion or
promotes unlawful or undesirable conduct, or is
inappropriate for children, or deeply offends others?
There is a common sense difference between
suppression and failing to subsidize, and government
must have greater discretion in the latter situation
than in the former."
Dean Stone then offers his own compelling reply to a
question he knows is not entirely rhetorical:
Reasonableness is not and cannot be, the
constitutional standard for government efforts to
restrict speech because the message is unwise,
131 Helms, supra note 34, at 320.
3

See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.

13 Harry Kalven Jr. Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

l Dean Geoffrey Stone, Harry Kalven Jr. Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School, Address at the Loop Luncheon, Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 18, 1990)
at 16-17 [transcript on file with the author].
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disagreeable, harmful or offensive. To the contrary,
if there is a central principle in our first amendment
jurisprudence, it is that government ordinarily may
not restrict expression for such reasons, for such
suppression distorts public debate, mutilates the
thought process of the community, violates the
equality of status in the field of ideas and elevates the
government to the role of platonic censor.'
The crucial issue is still that if government cannot fund all
artists or all works, it must make choices. If it makes choices, it must
adopt and apply standards. And if those standards are not simply
broad categories of media (for example, fund only oil paintings but
not water colors, support metal sculpture but not plastic, favor
portraits over landscapes), then there is inevitable potential for
differentiation on the basis of content. The difficulty is deciding
when that differentiation abridges or inhibits freedoms of expression
in ways the First Amendment will not allow.
Three concluding observations may aid the identification and
analysis of lurking constitutional issues. It is only artists among all
government grantees who forfeit benefits if they are convicted of
obscenity. Public employees, scholarship holders, public housing
tenants, and virtually anyone else who receives government support,
would continue to receive the largesse regardless of the
conviction.1 6 It is true that obscenity is more closely related to the
nature of an NEA grantee's work and status than to other
government benefits, but consider another dimension of the
argument; no other criminal transgression by an NEA grantee would
cause the loss of the grant. If, for example, an artist is convicted of
fraudulent art sales, selling drugs in the studio, or disposing of toxic
chemicals improperly, the NEA grant is unaffected. 37 Ironically,
it is the legal violation most closely related to the artist's creative
process which has been identified as the basis of possible forfeiture.
To focus in this way on artists among all government beneficiaries,
'

Id. at 19.

13

But cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1990), under which television and radio broadcasting

stations, which receive licensing from the government, may risk sanctions for
broadcasting of material deemed obscene. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.

726, 727 (1978).
Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 103(b), 104 Stat. 1963-66 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 954(d) (1990)).
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and on their expression among all possible legal violations, is at least
deserving of further constitutional scrutiny.
Another possible concern relates to procedure. It is quite true
the new reauthorization ties the sanction of potential loss of a prior
grant to a judicial determination based on criteria that have received
the Supreme Court's blessing."
Yet those criteria, and the
procedures by which they must be enforced to be constitutionally
acceptable, are now to be used to impose not one, but two quite
unrelated penalties on the artist/grantee.
The new approach seems not unlike revoking a state
university student's scholarship after a conviction for speaking on
campus and creating a clear and present danger, 139 or barring from
future government contracts any professional photographer convicted
of child pornography. In each case the primary sanction (conviction
of obscenity) is imposed by a jury trial which, as a process, is
presumptively valid.
However, the courts upholding those
convictions may not realize they are also validating a secondary or
collateral use of the primary sanction (revocation of the grant).
Therein lies the problem.
The function here of the secondary sanction is not only to
allow government to avoid its obligations of Due Process, but also to
compound the consequences of a single speech-related offense on the
basis of a proceeding designed only to impose criminal liability.
Courts have always been uneasy about allowing the outcome of one
proceeding to trigger automatically a collateral consequence, even
where Due Process is guaranteed in the primary proceeding."4
Moreover, the potential chilling effect of the secondary sanction may
in this instance far exceed that of the former, if only because the
value of a revoked NEA grant (like the student's scholarship or the
photographer's access to government jobs) may be far greater than
the fine one pays for a single brush with the criminal law. Thus, it
is fair to ask whether, especially in the area of expression, the
criminal proceedings that are valid for obscenity trials are designed
1m Id.

13

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). "The question in every case is
whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger .... " Id. at 52.
" See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989) (a defendant
convicted of a criminal charge may not be subject to civil sanction for the sole
purpose of further retribution without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment).
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to be adequate also to support the punitive superstructure Congress
has now imposed.
Finally, one must bear in mind that we are dealing with
obscenity, in all its vagaries. When one considers the potential for
regional variations in outcomes under the "community standards"
formula, one might also ask whether the primary proceeding was
intended to sustain such grave collateral consequences as the
reauthorization contemplates. An artist creates a work in one
locality, but that work may eventually find its way before a jury in
a much less enlightened community.14 That jury, applying its
community standards, may cause the forfeiture of an NEA grant
made to the artist as he or she worked in a vastly different
environment.
It is far from clear whether any of these concerns alone, or all
of them taken together, create doubts of constitutional magnitude.
They are, however, worth exploring and bearing in mind as we
watch the new NEA legislation take effect. The day may come when
such arguments will need to be made. We cannot, after all, assume
every jury will be as reasonable as the one in Cincinnati.
1" See, e.g., Contemporary Arts Ctr. v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Ohio 1990).

